Advanced IT Applications Supporting Gas Supply Security

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The basic postulates:

- Gas supply system a unified complex conecting gas field with consumer.
- The supply chain is only as strong as its weakest section.




Supply security: need for internal aspects

- energy security
 delivery security
 meternal delivery
 Member State level
- *N-1*: technical capacity of production, storage, border entry points, LNG terminal, in comparison with consumption;
- Ramboll SoS: gas production, storage, supply routes, transit, LNG terminal, capacity diversification, gas substitution possibility;
- Stockholm Economic School: import dependency and diversification, political stability (3rd countries), economic impact, easy of switching;
- Cambridge University: number of aspects of gas substitution;

	N-1, 2009	N-1, 2012	Ramboll, 2009	Stockholm, 2009	Cambridge, 2010
EE	144	60	2	0,097	Limited
LT	57	27	1,1	0,05	Near limited
LV	163	154	12,3	0,048	Very limited
Baltic		130			Limited

Implementation of the scientific support

- national gas transmission and distribution backbone networks – critical infrastructure, issue of national security;
- trilateral cooperation in the framework of the Baltic Energy Security Research Platform as the activity of national interest;



- content of the BESRP concrete projects to avoid the most probable security problems (the weakest sections):
 - technological accidents;
 - distant impact with economical and/or physical goal;


Joint risk assessment of security of gas supply: need to overcome national shortages (2012)

- 1. Expansion of Incukalns storage;
- 2. Enhancement of interconnection Latvia Lithuania;
- 3. Enhancement of interconnection Latvia Lithuania;
- 4. Connection Liepaja Palanga;
- 5. Connection Daugavpils -Visagina;
- 6. Hydraulic calculation software for management and supervision (including database) for gas transmission network system;
- 7. LNG terminal.
 - * PCI / BEMIP projects



Modelling of national/Baltic gas system


- development of mathematical model and simulation of the national / Baltic natural gas supply infrastructure under different future scenarios;
- growing dynamism, source and load changes:
 - back-up of RES (wind, solar);
 - liberalization and diversification;
- static regime network topology, energy balance, physical flows;
- dynamic regime hydraulic transition processes;
- detection of vulnerabilities, shortages, bottlenecks, weaknesses, threats.





Recommendations for enhancement and modernization of internal gas systems

ICS/SCADA: Industrial control system / Supervisory control and data acquisition



- monitoring and control of dispersed assets;
- development from standalone to networked TCP/IP based systems;
- growing capacity remote terminals, external data connections;
- increasing vulnerability external device, network, smartness;
- from individual hobby to economical & political hacking.

Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure

Activities

- high flow of information requests, overload;
- infiltration of spies for data collection;
- remote control over computers;
- change of planning, control, actions.

Goals

- destroying;
- commercial espionage.




Yearly

Cyber attack frequency patterns

Energy sector

- Aurora (2007);
- Stuxnet (2010);
- Duqu (2011);
- Night Dragon (2011);
- Flame (2012).



Risk assessment: high impact, high probability

Source: Analysis Intelligence

Activities and support

Gas 24x7 prevention and accident assistance

Outsourcing, training, consulting

- risk and contingency planning;
- regular everyday control;

company

- regular update of software;
- firewall and encryption –
 necessary but not a sufficient
 technological measures;
- assessment of usage of wireless communications and cloud computing, connection with public networks, Intranet, Extranet and Internet, etc.

Computer
Emergency
Response
Team
(CERT.LV)
CERT.EU
CERT.EU

CERT.LT

IT security

CERT.XX

- investigation of vulnerabilities of equipment, networks and information systems;
- threat analysis and modelling;
- incident reporting;
- cyber security engineering;
- insider threat analysis.

Final postulate:

Concentration of the competence is a crucial issue in small countries.

- Modelling of national gas transmission and distribution backbone networks.
- Increasing cyber security of ICS/SCADA of gas systems.



Thank you for attention!